A real options model of resource extraction is considered where management controls both the extraction rates as well as the quality of extracted material earmarked for processing into final product.
INTRODUCTION
It is often the case in a variety of resource industries that raw material has a distribution of economic value. In particular, some material may be deemed too poor in quality to be of economic use. The cutoff level between usable and rejected material is a function of the operational and economic circumstances. For example, consider a mining operation that can excavate 10 million tons of material per year but only has the capacity to process 4 million tons per year.
1 If the mine management decides to extract more than it can process, the lowest grade material will go to waste. Suppose that economic conditions are such that the mine management finds it optimal to extract the full 10 million tons per year; it would then choose to process only material in the top 40% of grade quality. Thus, economic conditions and operational constraints conspire to place a limit on the quality of material deemed suitable for processing. In the mining industry, the choice of minimum quality level is known as the cutoff grade.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the tradeoffs and interplay between extraction policy and quality control, as well as their impact on real production. One contribution of the paper is the identification of the opportunity cost of extraction as a crucial factor in determining the appropriate balance between extraction rates and quality cutoff. 2 This has previously been pointed out by Lane (1988) in a discounted cash flow model. 3 A more interesting contribution, from an economic point of view, is the analogy made in the paper between the opportunity cost and a call option written on the marginal extracted unit of material.
Consider the illustrative example of a resource extraction project (oil, forestry, mining, etc.) with finite reserve levels and maximum extraction capacity of 3 units per period.
Suppose that, after extraction, material can be sorted into low, medium and high quality categories, fetching prices of S l , S m and S h per unit, respectively. Naturally, S h > S m > S l .
The different grades of material are assumed to be present in equal amounts. Finally, assume that processing costs are k per unit processed and that there is an opportunity cost associated 1 This is usually due to uncertainty in price, variable grades of ore and expensive overhead. 2 The opportunity cost describes the loss of value due to reserve depletion. 3 Lane (1988), however, uses a different concept of opportunity cost than is used here. with extraction of ξ per unit. For the sake of simplicity, ξ is assumed constant.
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Consider now a situation where there is no restriction on the amount of material that can be processed. In this case, if it is worthwhile to extract one unit, it will be worthwhile to extract the maximum allowable. Production will therefore be zero or maximum -the socalled 'bang-bang' solution. The cutoff decision now involves choosing the quality of material which will be processed. If the cutoff is zero, all extracted material will be processed, resulting in a cash flow of S l + S m + S h − 3k − 3ξ. Table 1 shows the cash flows for this and two other cutoff choices.
Notice that the quality control decision does not depend on the opportunity cost, ξ, since the same cost is incurred in all scenarios. When prices are low, so that medium and low quality material cannot pay for their respective processing costs, the cutoff will be high.
When prices are high, so that processing even low-grade material produces profit, the cutoff will be low. This type of situation is known as a 'break even' cutoff strategy. The cutoff is chosen so that the revenues from material at the margin are equated with the marginal costs of processing. Any material that can pay its own processing costs is acceptable.
To investigate another possibility, consider a similar situation to the above, except that the maximum amount of material that can be processed is 1 unit per period. For simplicity, assume that either one unit will be processed or none at all. If more material is extracted than there is processing capacity, excess material is waste and the cutoff is the ratio of excess material to extraction level. Examples of such combined production and cutoff policies are given in Table 2 .
Because of the processing stage constraint, the cost of processing is the same for all the policies considered, namely, k. What differentiates between the policies this time is the amount of opportunity cost incurred. If one assumes that S h = 3S l and S m = 2S l , a simple arithmetic calculation shows that the first policy will be preferred to the others in the table when S l < 3 2 ξ. The second policy is preferred to the other two when 3 2 ξ < S l < 3ξ, and the third prevails when S l > 3ξ. A lower opportunity cost at the margin implies a higher standard of minimum quality. This is, again, a 'break-even' policy, although it is the marginal opportunity cost which must be exactly covered by marginal revenues.
If the opportunity cost is sufficiently low both the extraction and processing stage constraints will be binding (i.e., both stages will be at maximum capacity -policy 3 in Table   2 ). This last situation is termed a 'balancing' strategy by Lane (1988) . The opportunity cost will be low when removing a unit of resource is inconsequential to the value of the remaining reserves. This occurs when the reserve is very large or when prices are very low. More importantly, the cutoff and extraction levels increase, in the example, as S l − ξ increases.
To more closely examine the price dependence of the policies, suppose now that
sufficiently large; in other words, a < 1 leads to a cutoff policy which increases with prices. If a > 1, the opposite result obtains. This demonstrates the following important point: opportunity costs that are concave in price will correspond to production and cutoff grades that eventually increase with prices, while convex opportunity costs will be associated with the opposite behavior. The former case is somewhat unintuitive, since the naive policy is to waste less material when prices increase.
The inclusion of processing constraints into project operations thus introduces two types of quality control policies: a break-even type of policy, where revenues are equated to costs at the margin (policies 1 and 2 in Table 2 ); and a balancing policy where capacities are fully utilized (policy 3). In addition, the concavity/convexity of opportunity costs associated with extraction play a crucial role in determining the optimal strategy (and warrants an investigation into their nature).
The traditional (Hotelling) concept of opportunity cost of extraction measures the value lost by not deferring production. To explore this in continuous time, consider a project with current reserve levels of Q, maximum extraction rate of q, average quality 5 µ and per unit production costs of k. Assume there are no processing capacity constraints. In a frictionless model with log-normal commodity prices, the value of the project, J, follows the no-arbitrage partial differential equation (assuming that spot prices can be hedged):
where S t is the spot price at time t, r is the (constant) riskless interest rate, σ 2 is the instantaneous variance per unit time, δ is the (proportional) convenience yield and q t ∈ [0, q] is the extraction rate at time t. 6 The first term on the left corresponds to the usual capital gains under risk neutrality. The second term is the cash flow received at time t. The last term is a depletion cost; this includes the option value of deferring extraction since the value of rights to produce later is included in the loss of value due to depletion. At first glance, it seems reasonable to identify
∂J ∂Q
as an opportunity cost of extraction, but this association must be done with some caution. 7 For example, if the feasible set of extraction policies is constrained so that production cannot continue past a time T = Q/q, then the solution to
Eq. (1) is given by:
where E * denotes the risk adjusted (or risk neutral) expected value operator. This is essentially the McDonald and Siegel (1985) model of resource extraction approximating the 5 The mean quality, µ, is taken to be synonymous with the ratio of output to input. 6 qt is a control variable or strategy which may be subject to constraints. The optimal value of the project is obtained by finding the contingent strategy, qt, which maximizes J. 7 I thank the referee for pointing out this limitation and much of the following.
project value as a sum of European call options. Note that there is no traditional (Hotelling) opportunity cost since the option to defer production carries no value under the assumed production constraints.
∂J 0 ∂Q
, on the other hand is not zero. Thus
∂J ∂Q
incorporates more than the traditional concept of opportunity cost.
For the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to investigate how the Hotelling opportunity cost can be recovered from the more general depletion cost term. It turns out that optimal policies depend directly on the depletion term then under the optimal policy, J is a solution to the Brennan and Schwartz (1985) model.
Above the shutdown price boundary, J can be written as
where (S, Q) is the value added by the additional flexibility in deferring production. is a homogeneous solution to Eq. (1) obeying standard smooth-pasting boundary conditions.
The opportunity cost of extraction is easily calculated to be
where K(S, k, T ) is the value of a European call option written on the underlying commodity spot price, S, with strike price and time to maturity of k and T , respectively. To sign the second expression, note that lim Q→∞ (J −J 0 ) = 0. Since, in a frictionless model, = J −J 0 ≥ 0, it must be that for large Q, (S, Q) is a decreasing function of Q. This suggests that, above the shutdown price boundary, the opportunity cost for a large reserve is bounded by the value of a European option on the underlying commodity expiring at time T = Q/q.
For small reserves, however, the story is different. Above the shutdown price boundary the value of an added unit approaches µS − k as Q → 0. Thus Eq. (3) implies that lim Q→0 (S, Q) = 0. In this regime, since ≥ 0, is an increasing function of Q. Extracting a unit will therefore incur depletion costs greater than the value of the European call.
Note that this analysis assumes a frictionless operating environment. In the presence of frictions, Eq. (3) would be replaced with
where (S, Q) is the option value remaining after approximating the project as a series of discounted forward contracts. The opportunity cost is now
where F (S, Q/q) is the forward price of the commodity Q/q years in the future. In the extreme case where the frictions are so great so as to leave no flexibility, This must be qualitatively true even in more complicated situations. Intuitively, the cost of depletion is essentially the value added to the project when resources are increased by a unit (this is analogous to saying that the forward and backward limits of the derivative,
, agree). The earliest time at which the new unit can be processed is T = Q/q, where Q is the quantity of reserves remaining and q is the maximum capacity rate of resource extraction. At high prices, any flexibility for delaying the production of the new unit becomes irrelevant and the high price value of the added unit is the same as the present value of a forward contract with time to maturity, T , less the present value of extraction costs. That is precisely the high-price behavior of Eqs. (4) and (6) . Moreover, at sufficiently low prices, management can exercise the option to abandon the mine, imposing a floor value of zero to the added unit (hence the resemblance to a call option). The convexity/concavity of this option will depend on the spot price and the nature of the underlying price process (e.g., existence of mean reversion). The rest of the paper develops further the insights discussed above. In particular, the interaction between resource production (i.e., extraction, processing, etc.) and quality control (cutoff) is analyzed in more detail. The realization that a proper evaluation of opportunity costs requires a contingent claims approach is used to develop a model which combines the real options framework used by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) with the discounted cash flow cutoff grade model proposed by Lane (1988) . Brennan and Schwartz (1985) were the first to apply contingent claims analysis to resource extraction. Many other treatments have 
THE MODEL
To model contingent extraction and cutoff policies, one has to quantify the effects of policy change on future cash flows and reserve levels. An extracted resource can contain several types of similar commodities in varying concentrations. For example, diamond ore will contain various qualities of diamonds present in different amounts; an acre of timber can contain different species of trees in varying concentrations and quality. To simplify matters, the quality notion will be restricted to a single commodity present in extracted material 9 .
Consider a project, as shown schematically in Figure 1 , where a resource is removed at a rate q t ∈ [0, H] from reserves at time t. The variable cost of extraction is k w (S t ), where conundrum is resolved by realizing that, although the option forgone is essentially a forward-start American call, unless prices are very high (in which case flexibility is irrelevant), there are too few price paths which ensure that production of the forgone unit would feasibly start at time T . The option forgone must therefore be discounted by a time τ > T, and at high reserve levels the discounting at the longer effective maturity reduces the value below that of µK(S, k/µ, Q/q). 9 Treating the case where there are several types of commodities will complicate the analysis without proportional gain in insight.
S t is the commodity price at time t; extraction costs may depend on the commodity price when, for example, the resource must be purchased (e.g., stumpage fees for timber). The extracted material has a distribution of quality measured by c ∈ [c,c], which can be used for sorting. It is taken for granted that a unit of material with a higher value of c will fetch a higher price after processing. From here on, c is referred to as the 'grade' of the material.
Let the density for the distribution of possible grades be f (c). In general, controlling for quality corresponds to processing only material that is within some 'acceptable' interval.
A gold mine, for example, may choose to process only material which has more than 1 g. of gold per ton; another example is a sawmill where only logs with diameter between 12 and 36 inches are chosen for processing into lumber. At the risk of sacrificing some realism, it will be assumed that the acceptable interval of quality at time t is [c t ,c]. In other words, higher quality material is never rejected for the purpose of processing. 10 After extracting q t , it is assumed that material can be separated into components above and below the cutoff grade, c t . The proportion of q t which is below the cutoff grade can be disposed as waste or sold to another facility (stockpiling for future processing is discussed later in the paper). Suppose that the variable cash flow from the rejected material, not including extraction costs, is
given by k R (c t , S t ). The amount of material rejected is F (c t )q t , where F (c) is the cumulative distribution function for the grade distribution. Thus the rejected material at time t earns
The rest of the material extracted at time t is earmarked for processing. Some of this, however, can potentially go to waste because there is a limitation on the input processing capacity, G I . Thus the amount processed at time t is min(q t P (c t ), G I ) where
Assuming a cost per unit processed of k I (c), the added cost of processing acceptable material
The material chosen for processing must of course be converted to a final product.
The conversion depends on the grade, the degree of loss during handling, and facility output capacity constraints. To capture this, it is assumed that one unit of material destined for processing will yield g(c) units of final output (the conversion factor between input and output will depend on the cutoff grade). In mining, for example, the relationship between input and output is determined by the mean grade above cutoff; a higher value of c will increase the metal yield per unit input. In a sawmill, processing larger sized logs likewise increases output production per unit input. Assuming a maximum output capacity rate of G O , the output of finished product at time t is therefore given by min(
There are also costs associated with the amount of final output. Denote these as
In mining, these costs are associated with smelting, refining and/or shipping. The total real variable costs (per unit time) incurred before realizing revenues can be collected to give:
The amount of revenue from final output is given by S t min(
Adding all of the costs and revenues at time t gives the total cash flow at time t:
Using standard arguments (see, for example, Brennan and Schwartz (1985) ), the no-arbitrage PDE governing the value for an operating project is
where Q is the reserve size (assuming at most a trivial time dependence in the costs so that, as in the Brennan and Schwartz (1985) model, the arbitrage equation is independent of absolute time). A is the second-order diffusion (partial differential) operator associated with the spot price, interest rate process and all other correlated variables (denoted by the stochastic variable vector, S t ). 11 MN O is the rate of maintenance costs incurred while the project is operating. The maximization over q is constrained to give solutions between 0 and the maximum mining rate, H, while c is constrained to be in the support of f (x): between c andc. If the project is temporarily shut down, the relevant PDE becomes
where MN C is the schedule of maintenance costs for the project while shut. These equations must be solved with smooth pasting constraints that fix the temporary shut-down / start-up price boundaries in the presence of operating frictions (shut-down and start-up costs). It is assumed that shifts in production and cutoff levels are costless. Note that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a shut down policy is that MN O > MN C . Otherwise, management would be better off allowing production to drop to zero while paying the lower operating overhead costs. In fact, if interest rates are constant, as long as
where K C is the shut down cost, production will never fall to zero while the project is in operation; shutting down will be the preferred alternative.
To solve Eq. (10) one must maximize the cash flow in Eq. (9) with respect to q t and c t , then substitute the results back into Eq. (10) and solve the (possibly non-linear) PDE.
To this end, consider the generalized cash flow,
The generalized cash flow includes the opportunity cost,
, associated with extraction. The opportunity cost behaves as a premium on the variable extractions cost, k w (S t ).
The maximization in Eq. (10) is tantamount to maximizing Z(q t , c t ). Note that Z(q t , c t ), is quasi-linear in the extraction rate, q t . Maximization with respect to q t will therefore bind one of the capacity constraints. The optimal extraction rate, q (c t ), will be one of 11 For example, if prices are log-normal and interest rates are not stochastic, then a one-factor price model, St = St, with proportional convenience yield, δ,
Table 3
Optimal Quality Cutoff and Extraction Policies Policy # q c solves Type
Balancing Extraction-Output
Balancing Input-Output 0,
or H. 12 If it was not for the input and output capacity constraints, Z(q, c)
would be linear in q and maximization would produce the familiar 'bang-bang' solution: extraction would be zero or H.
The best way to proceed is to substitute each of the possible optimal extraction rates, q t , back into the generalized cash flow and maximize each resulting expression with respect to c. This gives a set of possible optimal policies. The chosen policy is the global maximum.
Given q (c t ), the maximum of Z(q (c t ), c t ) with respect to c t corresponds either to an interior optimum or to binding another of the capacity constraints. An interior optimum for c t obeys a first-order condition which sets marginal profits equal to marginal costs. In general, there will be six nontrivial candidates for the optimal policy: three policies with only one binding capacity constraint (and an interior maximum with respect to c t ), and three policies that bind two of the capacity constraints. The first three have been termed limiting policies by Lane (1988) , while the last three policies are known as balancing policies. This is summarized in Table 3 .
At any given time there are six possible candidates for an optimal policy (other than zero production). These are due to the effects of the three capacity constraints on the cash flow. The constraints are over extraction, processing input and final output capacities. Three of the candidate policies dictate that production and cutoff should be adjusted so that two of the capacities are fully utilized (binding or balancing strategies). The other three policies state that one of the capacities be maximally utilized while production and cutoff be adjusted so that the minimum level of acceptable material 'breaks even' at the margin. Opportunity costs are relevant to policies 2 and 3 (the first-order condition for policy 1 is independent of opportunity costs). This implies that even if all variable cost parameters are constant, the maximization over both c and q potentially yields a non-linear partial differential equation.
This is in contrast to the usual bang-bang solution that obtains in the absence of the cutoff control. It is difficult to say much more about the comparative statics of the optimal policies without specializing further. The next section applies the model to a sawmill operation and an open pit mine.
APPLICATIONS

Forestry: A Simple Sawmill Model
The harvesting of timber from tree stands and consequent conversion into marketable forest products is a complicated process involving numerous stages where economic decisions are made. What follows is a vulgarized model of such an operation where a firm can log on a government-owned timber tract and supply its sawmill with logs for conversion into lumber.
In particular, the model ignores the renewable nature of the resource. Given this limitation, the model would only apply to projects whose expected duration is much shorter than the time required for new growth to be ready for harvest. On the other hand, much of the intuition and the nature of the optimal policies should be robust. 13 For references on the use of option pricing in the forestry sector, see Plantinga (1998) .
Consider a firm that can harvest up to some capacity rate, H, paying stumpage fees for every unit volume extracted. Stumpage fees are paid by logging companies to 13 Eq. (10) assumes that the project under consideration extracts a non-renewable resource. If the resource is renewable at some costs, as in forestry, then the maximization on the right-hand side of the equation would have additional terms:
∂J O ∂Q + Cash Flowt − kτ τ , where τ is the rate of renewal and kτ is the variable cost of renewal. This addition may reduce the opportunity costs by affecting the size of resource reserves over time. It is easy to check, however, that the form of the solutions for the optimal strategies governing qt and ct is not changed.
governments for extracting forest resources from public land. The fees are frequently adjusted by local governments to reflect prevailing market and political conditions. The input capacity constraint is G I . There are no output capacity constraints on the sawmill operation, and the amount of lumber at the output end is assumed to be dependent on the average diameter of logs at the input side. It is assumed that a higher average diameter at input would result in higher output yield. 14 A given log is chosen for milling on the basis of its diameter. The quality measure, c, is therefore the diameter of harvested material. Timber considered too small in diameter is sold at a price that covers the stumpage fees and logging/transportation costs. It is assumed that markets are sufficiently competitive so that profits made from rejected material are marginal.
Specifically, it is assumed that f (c) is the distribution of log diameters for the population of timber units in the stand (measured in volume). The costs of logging are k o w per cubic meter and the stumpage fees are assumed proportional to the price of lumber.
In other words,
where χ Stump is a constant. Since rejected material covers its own costs, it does not contribute to the cash flow. 15 This implies that
. If the cost of milling timber of uniform diameter, c, is κ(c), then the input variable cost, k I (c t ), is an average cost of milling for the distribution of logs chosen for pro-
Likewise, if the output yield from material of uniform diameter, c, is γ(c), then the total output for the timber above the cutoff is an average,
It is reasonable to assume that the cost of milling, κ(c), is decreasing in diameter, c; further, as mentioned above, γ(c) is monotonically increasing. Finally, it is assumed that the variable cost at output is constant, k O (c) = k O . Using previous 14 This is not entirely a realistic assumption. A production line would tend to slow down when supplied with very large logs.
Accounting for this would require an additional cutoff control for larger diameter material, and making the input capacity a decreasing function of diameter. Such a complication, however, would not add much insight to the analysis. It is therefore assumed that the sawmill can handle any log size. 15 The quality control problem is most acute when it is not profitable for the firm to act as a timber supplier. To emphasize this aspect, it is assumed that the firm cannot be financed solely by its harvesting technology. Given that, there is little loss of generality in setting the cash flow from rejected harvested material to zero.
Table 4
Sawmill Optimal Policies in Period t
Policy #
notation, the model can be summarized by
where S is the prevailing price for lumber.
It can be shown that the generalized cash flow, Z(q, c), take the following form:
The optimal policies for harvesting and cutoff at time t are derived by maximizing Z(q t , c t ) subject to 0 ≤ q t ≤ H and c ≤ c ≤c. The analysis in section 2 applies, but the set of possible optimal policies is reduced to three, since there are only two capacity constraints. Table 4 describes the candidate optimal policies.
Policy 1 corresponds to a strategy where the logging rate is maximum and total revenues from marginal quality timber exactly cover the costs. This is a break-even cutoff policy analogous to the first strategy discussed in the introductory example (Table 1) . Policy 3 is the balanced strategy that binds the production and input capacity constraints (i.e., both are fully utilized). In the second and most interesting policy, the first term in the first-order condition is the marginal revenue per unit input; the second term is the marginal savings in input costs for the said unit. The final term is the opportunity cost incurred per unit input. The policy therefore equates marginal revenues and savings to the opportunity cost,
. This is also a break-even policy analogous to the second scenario discussed in the introduction example (see Table 2 ).
The comparative statics of policies 1 and 2 are given by,
Policy 1 concerns a scenario in which the harvesting capacity is at a maximum, but there is slack in the processing capacity. In some sense, the mill is 'starving' for material. The adjustment of the cutoff in reaction to a price increase depends on whether the output yield of marginal material, γ(c ), is greater than the government's share in profits, χ Stump . Thus the government can set the stumpage fees, χ Stump S, to encourage an increase or decrease of c in response to lumber price movements; this would also impact overall production output (and indirectly, employment and the corporate tax bill). If χ Stump > γ(c ), the firm will not mill lower quality timber in times of high lumber prices; instead, production would be outsourced. If χ Stump < γ(c ), then the opposite happens; production capacity will be increasingly utilized during times of high prices.
Policy 2, which fully exploits the processing capacity, reacts to price movements in a way that crucially depends on the opportunity cost. If the opportunity cost is convex at large prices, then the right-hand side of Eq. (19) eventually becomes negative. This implies a policy which harvests less timber at higher prices since poor-grade material can be used to fully utilize the milling capacity. A concave opportunity cost function, however, will not dominate the right-hand-side of Eq. (19), implying increasing cutoff at high prices. In the presence of a concave opportunity cost function, policy 2 harvests more timber in reaction to higher prices, preferring to supply the mill with higher quality wood than to prolong the life of the resource reserve.
convexity/concavity of the opportunity cost. At lower prices the opportunity cost should be convex in price because it embodies the call option floor on the marginal unit harvested.
At higher prices, however, the behavior of the opportunity cost depends on the nature of the underlying spot price process. A casual analysis of lumber futures prices suggests that returns on lumber are better described by a random walk with drift than a mean reverting process. 16 Since a call option on an asset with random walk returns is convex, the opportunity cost for harvesting timber should be convex. This realization can have significant policy implications at the firm level. Specifically, there is an economic argument for a more conservative harvesting approach whenever processing capacity is dwarfed by harvesting capacity. In such a case, higher NPV is implied by a policy that prolongs the life of the resource rather than one that depletes it opportunistically during times of increasing prices.
The analysis above disregards taxes. Such frictions are important to add in realistic applications but they do not change the essence of the points made. Opportunity costs are not real expenses and they cannot be deducted from the tax bill. This means that, in the presence of taxes, marginal opportunity costs are magnified by a factor of
, where τ m is the corporate tax rate at the margin. The general effect would be to reduce the amount of waste by reducing the cutoff from where it would be in the absence of taxes (when policy 2 is in effect).
As an example consider a sawmill with operating parameters as given in Table 5 . The model is solved numerically. This in itself is an arduous task because the optimal cutoff, and thus the cash flows, are nonlinear function of the opportunity cost. Moreover, smooth pasting conditions, as in Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Brekke and Øksendal (1991), must be imposed for the optimal stopping boundaries corresponding to shutting, restarting or abandoning the mill. Solutions are generated by a convergent iterative scheme, which 16 The author analyzed futures contracts on random-length lumber from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (January 1998 to October 1998). A fit to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process gave a mean reversion parameter that was essentially zero. A fit to a random walk with drift gave an annual diffusion parameter of 34.3% and a proportional annual convenience yield of 1.5%
(assuming an annual riskless rate of 6%). Given the short observation period, however, it would be presumptuous to infer that lumber prices necessarily follow a geometric Brownian motion process.
Table 5
Sawmill Example Parameters
Model Input Assumptions
Diameter Distribution Diameters of timber units (measured in cubic meters) are distributed with mean and standard deviation of 18 and 6 inches, respectively. The population of timber units is assumed to be log-normal. obeys a variational inequality associated with the smooth pasting conditions.
Capacity Constraints
For varying levels of resource reserves, the optimal harvest and diameter policy are given in Figure 2 , as is the opportunity cost. Note that the opportunity cost resembles a call option on a dividend-paying asset following a log-normal price process. The opportunity cost only begins to decrease with reserve size at very high prices (not seen in the graph);
this is because the convenience yield used in the calculation is fairly small.
At larger reserve levels, the harvesting and diameter cutoff policies change nearly discontinuously between policy 3, which harvests more intensively, and policy 2, which is more conservative. Intuitively, at low prices both the harvesting and milling constraints are binding; the cash flow is therefore maximized at a boundary point of the feasible strategy space even if there is an interior local maximum. As prices increase, an interior optimum may emerge as the global maximum, and at that point the optimal strategies shift from the boundary to the interior of the feasible strategy space. Although this may seem somewhat technical, there are important economic and policy implications. In practice, the interior and boundary optima may be very close in cash flow value. The boundary optimum is, however, less ecologically efficient. It may therefore be possible, through judicious use of taxes, to allow the interior optimum to dominate while keeping firm revenues almost unchanged.
Mining: An Open Pit Copper Mine
For an operating mine, there are typically three stages of production: (i) the mining stage, where units of various grade are extracted up to some capacity. (ii) the treatment stage, where ore is milled and concentrated, again up to some capacity constraint; and (iii) the marketing stage, where the concentrate is smelted and/or refined to a final product which is shipped and sold; the last stage is also subject to capacity constraints. All three stages have associated costs. After the first stage, it is possible to direct mined units either to a waste dump (or stockpile) or to the treatment mill. The grade above which extracted material is milled is called the milling cutoff grade. It is thus clear that management has at least two dynamic controls to optimize: mining level and milling cutoff grade.
17 Interested readers may contact the author for more details on the numerical algorithm.
There is another type of cutoff grade, called the pit cutoff grade, which determines the optimal limits of the pit walls, and thus the ultimate size of the reserve. This also defines the grade distribution of material that will be removed during the life of the mine. In principle, the mine plan can change in reaction to economic conditions. However, because of the scale and costs entailed, design changes are akin to strategic expansion decisions. Recognizing this, it can further be argued that the predominant effect of pit cutoff grade adjustments would be to reduce the opportunity cost of extraction at high prices; this is because high prices will signal a reserve size expansion, which would consequently reduce the opportunity cost. The qualitative behavior of the opportunity cost should, however, remain unchanged.
Although an important planning problem, a full pit design model is beyond the scope of this paper. A useful extension of the model would, however, incorporate deposit expansion into the set of management flexibility. The example to be discussed below assumes that the pit size is fixed and that it contains a single ore zone which can be described by an appropriate grade tonnage distribution. Although it is common for deposits to consist of multiple zones, single zone analysis is standard (see Lane (1988) ). In a large-scale operation, material is extracted in basic Selected Mining Units (SMU's) -say, truckloads -of 'known' grade which can be individually diverted to the mill or the waste dump. Although there is flexibility in how the SMU's are scheduled for extraction, this is usually severely limited by the geometry of the pit and the pit plan. It is assumed that during the relevant time scale for planning (i.e., months) enough SMU's are extracted to fully sample the grade distribution in the pit.
It is therefore sensible to speak of a milling cutoff grade applied to the extracted units. 18 .
From here on all references to the cutoff grade should be interpreted as referring to the milling cutoff grade.
To specifically apply the results from Section 2, assume that the variable cost parameters are constant and rejected SMU's are disposed without the option to stockpile or provide revenues by some other means. These assumptions will be discussed later in this subsection.
18 One can think of the individual SMU's as samples from the grade tonnage distribution. Any SMU extracted which has a grade above the milling cutoff will be processed. In the time scales of interest here, sufficient numbers of SMU's move through the mill to make averaging over the grade tonnage distribution, f (x), sensible. Further, it is assumed that f (x) doesn't change through time -i.e., f (x) is spatially stationary. 
As before, f (x) denotes the statistical grade distribution of SMU's in the reserve. The mean of this distribution is denoted by µ. The conversion factor between input and output, g(c),
is simply the mineral content of processed material times a recovery factor,
That is, g(c) is a recovery factor, R, times the mean grade above the cutoff. Given the above assumptions, it is possible to show that the maximization in Eq. (10) is equivalent to a maximization of the generalized cash flow,
subject to the constraints
The candidate optimal policies are described in Table 6 .
constraint is binding and marginal costs are equated to marginal revenues. In policy 1, any material that earns enough to cover input and output costs is acceptable. Policy 2 demands that at the cutoff, the marginal revenues per unit input be equated to the marginal costs incurred. Policy 3 sets the marginal revenues per unit output to equal their marginal variable costs. Both policy 2 and 3 involve the opportunity cost,
. The comparative statics for these policies are given by, The standard model for the determination of optimal cutoff grades is that developed by Lane (1988 
Noting that
∂V ∂Q
does not explicitly depend on q t and c t , this results in Lane's equation:
where the maximization is subject to the constraints in Eq. (22) (10) and (30) give equivalent optimal policies and valuations. 19 Since Lane ignores random price components and uses a discount factor instead, to reproduce his results one simply needs to set the diffusion parameter to zero and write
One problem with Lane's approach of ignoring price fluctuations is that the option aspect of the opportunity cost,
, is not transparent or even useful in the analysis. There has been an attempt to place Lane's theory in the context of contingent claims analysis by Mardones (1991 Mardones ( , 1993 . He develops a model where the cutoff decision is calculated using
Lane's discounted cash flow approach and the resulting 'optimal' cutoff level is used in a contingent claims valuation of the mine. This treatment is not fully consistent because the cutoff grade is not optimized along with the objective function. Mardones does not discuss the call option aspect of opportunity costs.
20
The assumption of constant variable costs is fairly standard, even though it may be violated in practice. Cutoff-dependent costs can be handled as in the sawmill example; the main impact is to add marginal savings to the marginal revenues in the first-order conditions. As discussed in Section 2, variable costs that increase with mining level will potentially introduce interior optima (e.g., solutions where none of the capacity constraints are binding). Although tedious, it is possible to show that adding quadratic components, q 2 and q 2 P 2 (c), to the costs does not qualitatively change the results even when an interior solution for q obtains. In general, the comparative statics are such that the sign of ∂c ∂S can depend on the behavior of the opportunity cost.
Another feature ignored in the analysis is the stockpiling option. Essentially, one expects that the future value of a unit designated for the stockpile will reduce the opportunity cost incurred in extraction. In the presence of a stockpiling option, the opportunity cost would only account for the loss of material that has been processed (i.e., a fraction of the unit extracted). For example, assuming no stockpiling, at very high prices (when call options can be approximated by discounted forwards) the opportunity cost per unit mined is ≈ µ exp(−rT )F T where r is a constant riskless rate, T is the amount of life left in the reserve, F T is the forward price of one unit of the commodity, and µ is the mean grade of the mined unit. If there is an option to stockpile, then one only loses the opportunity to exploit the processed fraction, P (c). Thus the opportunity cost would become ≈ P (c)g(c) exp(−rT )F T .
Note that this does not alter the behavior of the opportunity cost with respect to price. In other words, concave opportunity costs remain concave and convex opportunity costs remain so as well. The analysis should thus be fairly robust to the inclusion of complications such 20 The referee has pointed out that one clear advantage of the discounted cash flow model is its simplicity. Dagdelen (1997) , for example, shows how to extend Lane's model to include multiple minerals and stockpiling. In the presence of stochastic prices, this would be challenging since smooth-pasting solutions to the arbitrage PDE's become exponentially cumbersome with added risk factors. However, if one is prepared to give up the advantage of analytic optimal policies in continuous time (e.g., Table 6 ), there are alternatives to the PDE approach which would yield a far more consistent valuation than discounted cash flow (see Smith and McCardle (1999) and Laughton (1998)).
Table 7
Open Pit Copper Project Parameters
Model Input Assumptions
Grade Distribution Copper grade is distributed log-normally with mean grade of 0.5% and standard deviation of .27%. as level dependent variable costs and stockpiling.
Capacity and Recovery
Consider next an open pit Copper mine project with the parameters given in Table   7 . Figures 3a and 3b plot the value of the mine when operating and while temporarily shut.
Shown are the curves for reserve levels varying from 10 to 50 million tons of raw material. If the mine is currently operating, then the optimal policy is given by the curves in Figure 3a .
If the mine is currently shut, then it opens or abandons according to the curves in Figure   3b . When spot prices warrant, the mine opens or remains open (solid lines); otherwise, it is temporarily shut down or remains shut (dashed lines). Startups always happen at higher prices than shutdowns because of the costs involved (hysteresis). Site abandonment occurs when the value of the project approaches the abandonment costs. Note that the approach to abandonment is steep; the 'elbow' is an artifact of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which features very strong mean reversion at low prices (the strength of the mean reversion diverges as prices fall to zero). Mine operation is conducted by following a continuous series of such curves as the mine is depleted and spot prices change. Thus a policy exists for every possible price path.
More interestingly, Figures 4a and 4b show the optimal extraction and cutoff policies for the open mine. Because the marketing stage represents the most severe constraint, optimal policies tend to saturate output capacity. At low prices the dominant strategy is of the break-even type (policy 3) whether reserves are high or low. As spot prices increase, a shift in policy will occur when little reserves are left (i.e., opportunity costs are high). Large reserve projects will, however, remain on a break-even policy. The low reserve projects are more sensitive to price movements. This is demonstrated by the more dramatic reaction of the optimal policies to changes in spot prices.
The figures show that at high prices the cutoff decreases as the reserve is depleted.
This recovers Lane's observation. Notice that there is quite a bit of slack in the mining capacity; such slack, present at all spot prices and reserve levels, points to poor planning.
Because the output capacity is kept at a maximum, decreases in the cutoff result in a lower extraction rate. . Note that the vertical axis corresponds to $ per ton. There are roughly 11 lbs. of copper per ton extracted when the cutoff is zero and less for higher cutoff. For comparison, Figure 5 shows the term structure for European options on the commodity. Although not exact copies, there is a remarkable similarity, verifying that opportunity costs are analogous to forgone options which expire when the reserve is depleted. Notice that the opportunity cost does not resemble American-style options that asymptote to some line with finite slope. Instead, with larger reserve sizes the opportunity costs approach a flat line at large prices, analogous to a long-term forward for the OrnsteinUhlenbeck process (see Schwartz (1997 Schwartz ( , 1998 for more discussion on the long-term behavior of forward prices). This will not occur with an American style option, since the freedom to exercise it anytime endows it with a minimum positive slope at high prices. As mentioned in the introduction, however, the resemblance to a European call option is a function of the reserve size and operating flexibility chosen.
Much was said earlier about the possibility that minimum acceptable quality could actually increase as prices increase. To see this, consider the project described in Table 7 , Figure 7c ; the curves resemble the term structure of European options on the now log-normal commodity price. Once again, the interpretation of the opportunity cost as a call option forgone is useful.
It is worth noting that when Lane's model is used to analyze the last example ( Figure   7 ), there are two general patterns. The mine value is lower, particularly at lower prices. This is the well-known option component added in the contingent claims approach. The cutoff and extraction policies have the same shape and trends, but are generally higher. In other words, with a log-normal price process, the contingent claims valuation gives a more conservative strategy for resource exploitation. This is due to a higher potential for future profitability ascribed to 'waste' by the real options analysis. The difference can be as large as 10% at intermediate prices (at sufficiently high prices there is not much difference). Such differences can make a serious impact on the duration of the operation.
CONCLUSIONS
This study demonstrates that complexities in real-life production can be fruitfully modeled using real options analysis. In particular, the approach lends deep insight into how different options available to managers can be optimally utilized. The most significant contributions of this paper are: (i) the identification of the opportunity cost of extraction as a key variable in constructing optimal production policies; and (ii) the realization that the opportunity cost resembles a call option written on the underlying commodity which expires when reserves are depleted. The reason the opportunity cost is so important in this model is that capacity constraints force the inefficient use of the resource, some of which must be wasted.
Even in the absence of quality control (and processing capacity constraints), opportunity cost will play an important role when extraction costs are convex. Consider, for example, the Brennan and Schwartz (1985) model with convex costs, k(q). The Bellman equation requires the maximization of the generalized cash flow,
Production will therefore be given by
Because k(q) is convex, k −1 is monotonically increasing. Thus the optimal extraction policy is an increasing function of (S t −
∂J O ∂Q
). Clearly, here too, the convexity/concavity of the opportunity costs will play a crucial role. The reaction of production to price will depend
is convex, then this will generally decrease, implying that production decelerates in response to increasing prices. If
is concave, then production accelerates with price.
There are many important applications that can extend the analysis presented here.
Project planning is a good example. Recall that in the first mining example the simulations revealed slack that would never be utilized in the extraction capacity. It is important to plan projects in such a way as to avoid such slack since over-capacity typically implies higher overhead costs. Another application might be in social welfare and waste management. Recall that taxes would increase the relative magnitude of the opportunity costs, thereby promoting a more efficient usage of resources. This poses an interesting possibility for governments to balance ecological and economic considerations by optimally adjusting the tax code for resource based industries. Finally, the call option nature of opportunity costs can allow for qualitative insights when analyzing complicated control problems.
Another issue is that the long-term behavior of commodity prices is crucial for a proper understanding of opportunity cost. This is still a fledgling area of research with some promising work appearing recently by Routledge, Seppi and Spatt (2000) and Schwartz (1997 Schwartz ( , 1998 ). In particular, Schwartz's work suggests that commodities, such as copper and oil, have both mean reverting and persistent components. This would impact on the opportunity cost in a non-trivial way; the high-price behavior (concavity/convexity) will depend on the reserve size (i.e., time to expiry). The implication is that differences in optimal policies between operations with small versus large reserves will be enhanced. Table 7 . The different curves correspond to various deposit sizes (in millions of tons of material). Figure 5 European call option written on the copper content of a ton of ore from the deposit described in Table 7 . The strike price is $0.90. The different curves correspond to various deposit sizes.
